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ABSTRACT
Northern Uganda has been plagued by a long and violent civil war
that lasted from 1996 to 2006, during which 2.5 million people were
internally displaced and placed in camps. During the conﬂict,
Uganda adopted a new constitution and a new land act that
recognised customary land tenure and the role played by
customary institutions in resolving land disputes. Following the
cessation of hostilities in 2006, people began to go back “home”,
and many land conﬂicts ensued. Because women are generally
considered as particularly vulnerable in land conﬂicts, they have
received much attention from the Ugandan government,
international donors, and NGOs. This article focuses on how women
make use of the existing legal pluralism in Uganda to defend their
interests in land disputes. It argues that land conﬂicts are often
proxies of social conﬂicts, which play a major role in women’s
opting for customary institutions to resolve their land conﬂicts.
KEYWORDS
Legal pluralism; forum
shopping; gender; Northern
Uganda; Acholi; land conﬂicts
Introduction
Northern Uganda has been plagued by a long and violent civil war during which 2.5 mil-
lion people were internally displaced and placed in camps. During the conﬂict, Uganda
adopted a new constitution and a new land act, that recognised customary land tenure
and the role played by customary institutions in resolving land disputes. When the cessa-
tion of hostilities agreement was signed in 2006, people began to return “home”, and
many land conﬂicts ensued.
Because women are considered as particularly vulnerable in land conﬂicts, they have
received much attention from the Ugandan government, international donors, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). This article focuses on how women make use of the
existing legal pluralism in Uganda to defend their interest in land disputes. It ﬁrst introdu-
ces the concepts of legal pluralism and forum shopping, and discusses the advantages and
disadvantages commonly associated with them. It then presents the historical and social
context for land conﬂicts, with a special focus on gender, and compares how statutory
and customary laws and institutions deal with them. Finally, it maps the different institu-
tions that are part of forum shopping, and discusses two extended cases that illustrate
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how women use forum shopping strategically to further their interests. We argue that
forum shopping might beneﬁt women, especially when land conﬂicts are proxies of social
conﬂicts.
Legal pluralism and forum shopping
Legal pluralism generally describes a situation in which two or more laws, legal systems or
normative orders coexist (Michaels 2009, 245; Grifﬁths 1986; Woodman 1998; Rouland
1994; Vanderlinden 1989; Moore 1978, 57). Legal pluralism sees the existence of more
than one legal order as resulting from the fact that human activity takes place in a multi-
tude of social ﬁelds (Moore 1973) or social networks (Vanderlinden 1989), each of which
generates and enforces its own rules. As a result, individuals are subject to as many regula-
tory orders as social ﬁelds or networks as they participate in.
Legal pluralism may arise where the state, through legislation, acknowledges and allows
different bodies of religious laws or customary laws to be accommodated within the state
institutional framework (Grifﬁths 1986; Woodman 1998). Legal pluralism may also occur
as an empirical reality in which informal normative authorities regulate behaviour in a
given society and coexists de facto with formal law, independently of whether a state gives
them ofﬁcial recognition or not (Grifﬁths 1986; Woodman 1998). Generally therefore, in
situations of plurality, individuals or groups ﬁnd themselves presented with the possibility
of options between and among those various normative orders and legal systems that are
recognised within the normative framework of the state and those that exist de facto out-
side of any formal recognition. In the present paper, we distinguish between the formal
State court system, that works with magistrates and that passes judgement on who is right
and who is wrong, and alternative or informal fora comprising any forum that is not a
State court (including local councils, traditional authorities, government ofﬁcials and
NGOs), that have no authority to pass judgements and that focus on mediations.
Disputants choose between co-existing normative orders and institutions, according to
the constraints they face and the outcome they hope to achieve in different arenas. This
propensity has been described as “forum shopping” (Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-
Beckmann 2010, 175; Whytock 2010; Juenger 1988, 554; Benda-Beckmann 1981, 171).
The choice of one forum is not only made according to preferences for certain legal prin-
ciples, but can also depend on non-legal differences such as physical and ﬁnancial accessi-
bility and impartiality, or cultural preferences based upon both cultural and legal
traditions (Whytock 2010, 485; Benda-Beckmann 1981, 117).
Legal pluralism and forum shopping come with both challenges and opportunities. On
the one hand, legal pluralism is regarded as detrimental to women’s rights, because of the
widespread view that customary institutions are procedurally biased and discriminate
against women (Chopra and Isser 2012, 339; Corradi 2011, 2; Chirayath et al. 2005).
Women are for example excluded from the dispute resolution process, the panel of adju-
dicators being composed exclusively of old men (Wehrmann 2008). Khadigala notes that
local customs can defy women’s rights with impunity and may have disempowering
implications for rural African women and their claims to resources (Khadigala 2001).
Moreover, the possibility of bringing cases simultaneously or successively in a variety of
fora can serve a dilatory purpose and delay justice, or even bias it, because powerful actors
dissatisﬁed with the outcome of justice in one forum can bring their case to other fora
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until they are satisﬁed, or until they exhaust the means and patience of their opponent
(Spiertz 2000, 191; Chopra and Isser 2012). Thus, since power often plays out strongly
against women, forum shopping has been seen to work to the disadvantage of women,
because the powerful (usually men) tend to choose a forum that will determine the out-
come at the expense of the vulnerable who are able to exploit only a limited number of
opportunities (Chopra and Isser 2012, 353; Adoko and Levine 2009). This manipulation
by the powerful is perceived to water down the advantages that arise from the possibility
of choice created for disputants, but also from the possibility for the fora involved in dis-
pute resolution to collaborate and complement each other (Kobusingye, Van Leeuwen,
and Van Dijk 2016).
On the other hand, in many developing countries as well as in post-conﬂict situations,
legal pluralism is deemed to increase access to justice since the absence of formal courts is
compensated by the services provided by local institutions of dispute processing (Corradi
2011, 2; Wojkowska 2006; Barrera 2015, 6; Chopra and Isser 2012). Because formal state
justice is not always accessible to the majority of people, informal systems can thus act as
an alternative. In addition to their inaccessibility, some of the formal justice systems are
also dysfunctional, most particularly in post-conﬂict or fragile states (Barrera 2015, 7;
Chopra and Isser 2012, 449). Because these systems are faced with huge case backlogs,
cases usually take a very long time to get resolved (Barrera 2015, 7). Backlogs works to the
disadvantage of the vulnerable, who often have to contend with long geographical distan-
ces from their homes to the formal courts and bear the ﬁnancial burden of travel costs, as
the formal resolution of cases is often postponed.
By contrast, some authors argue that informal justice systems are more accessible
because they are closer to people’s lives and culture, are built on local norms and local
conceptions of justice, have a high legitimacy, are process-oriented, and are cost-effective
(Kindi 2010, 9; Levine and Adoko 2006; Rugadya 2008; Wojwoska 2006, 1; Stevens 2000).
Generally, when disputants have active choices, they can navigate between plural
options. Their legal preferences arise from their socio-political situation and their assess-
ment of where they are likely to get the best outcome (e.g. Basu 2012; Corradi 2011; Kha-
diagala 2001; Rao 2007; Chopra and Isser 2012, 353). Many women begin with more
accessible and less costly community or customary fora, and progress to the formal courts
system only if they fail to get a satisfactory outcome (Domingo and O’Neil 2014, 25). But
they can also iterate between fora by moving from community forum to court and back
again to the community, or by making claims in several fora simultaneously in order to
increase their bargaining power (Domingo and O’Neil 2014, 25). Case studies on women’s
disputes to protect and advance their marriage and land rights illustrate the variety of
ways through which women combine and navigate between different legal systems, com-
bine individual rights drawn from formal and informal norms, and use different legal
forums in strategic ways (Grifﬁths 1996; Hirsch 1998).
Social and economic resources play a major role in women’s choices, however, and the
possibilities for women to forum shop should not be overestimated. Because access to the
formal justice system is costly and therefore restricted to those having substantial ﬁnancial
means (Grifﬁths 1996; Corradi 2011), women rely primarily on customary institutions to
solve their problems. When women do seek remedy outside of the community, hybrid
and/or specialised Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) fora are preferred over formal
court systems, because these hybrid institutions have the beneﬁt of their public authority
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL LAW 3
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in addition to being more affordable, physically closer and less intimidating than state
courts (Rao 2007; Leonardi et al. 2010, 11–14; Domingo and O’Neil 2014, 25). But even
though women do not directly challenge cultural or religious norms, they nevertheless
creatively frame their claims within the combination of statutory and cultural or religious
norms (Hirsch 1998). Thus, the coexistence of formal law side-by-side with customary
law can contribute to improving women’s situations, even though women rely mainly on
informal institutions to solve their disputes (Corradi 2011).
This paper explores how legal pluralism and forum shopping are used as tactics that
beneﬁt women in Northern Uganda. Based on empirical data that we present below, we
agree with Tanja Chopra and Deborah Isser (2012, 352) that customary systems are nei-
ther essentially good nor bad for women: it depends on how they are interpreted and
applied. As a consequence, the implementation of women’s rights requires engaging with
legal pluralism rather than seeking to hasten its end (Chopra and Isser 2012, 352). We
also agree with Corradi (2011, 24) that “given the role of non-state justice in producing
and reproducing gendered relations, interventions need to engage with these too”. Fur-
ther, we adopt Helium’s view that sees women as agents of change who mobilise different
strategies of action in negotiating and securing their rights (Hellum 2000, 639).
We argue that in Northern Uganda, women can and actually do strategically use legal
pluralism and forum shopping to their advantage. To bolster our argument, we present
and discuss concrete case studies in which women rely on different and competing legal
institutions to solve their problems. The cases that we discuss all relate to conﬂicts con-
cerning customary land in the Acholi sub-region. In our discussion, we do not understand
forum shopping as simply a binary choice between a statutory and a customary legal sys-
tem, but rather as a choice between a wider range of different legal actors and institutions.
Legal pluralism in Uganda
In Uganda, legal recognition is given to customary law as well as customary law institu-
tions. Article 237 of the Constitution of 1995 ofﬁcially recognises customary land tenure
as a form a legal tenure, and Section 3 of the Land Act speciﬁcally describes customary
tenure as a tenure that is managed according the norms and customs of a particular com-
munity. Section 88 of the Land Act mandates that the traditional institutions can either
determine or mediate over customary land disputes. It speciﬁcally provides in sub section
(1) that; “Nothing in this Part shall be taken to prevent or hinder or limit the exercise by
traditional authorities of the functions of determining disputes over customary tenure or
acting as a mediator between persons who are in dispute over any matters arising out of
customary tenure.” In addition to ofﬁcially recognising traditional authorities, the Local
Council Court Act of 2006 gives the Local Council Courts unlimited mandate to deal with
disputes in respect to land held under customary tenure (3rd schedule to Local Council
Court Act 2006, Laws of Uganda, Section 10(e). Thus, Ugandan laws organise a system of
legal pluralism that comprises the formal court system, the Local Council Courts and the
Traditional Institutions. In addition to the three ofﬁcial categories mentioned expressly
within the Land Act, there are also a number of other channels that participate in land dis-
pute management, such as NGO or elected and appointed government leaders from the
lower administrative unit at sub county level to the higher administrative unit at the
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District Level. However, these channels are not mandated by law to resolve land disputes,
and their involvement is therefore informal.
All of these formal and informal institutions are mandated by law and do apply cus-
tomary law in the determination of all matters relating to customary land tenure in as far
as the customary norms applied do not contradict the constitution or deny women, chil-
dren, and persons with disabilities access to customary land, or violate their rights to
equality under the Constitution. The choice of law is forum-neutral and uniform across
all fora, with the choice of forum having no effect on the substantive law applied. How-
ever, the Land Act is silent about the collaboration between the traditional institutions,
the Local Council Courts and the formal magistrates Courts. The implication of this is
that a dispute can be brought before the magistrates court, a local council court and before
traditional institutions at the same time, without these systems knowing what is taking
place before the others.
Historical and social background to land conﬂicts in Northern Uganda
Land has become a very sensitive issue in Northern Uganda since the end of the civil war
in 2006. The civil war began in the mid-1980s and was characterised by a high level of vio-
lence. Approximately 60,000 to 100,000 children were abducted and used as child soldiers,
porters, or “wives” of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) soldiers, more than 100,000 people
were killed, and about 2.5 million civilians were displaced by the war (United Nations
2013). At the height of the conﬂict, about 90 per cent of the population of Northern
Uganda was displaced in camps, where living conditions were appalling (Dolan 2009).
The ﬁrst displacement of people goes back to the beginnings of the conﬂict, but in 1996,
the state ofﬁcially forced people to leave their homes and to stay in internally displaced
camps that were protected by the army.
In 1995, the new Constitution acknowledged for the ﬁrst time customary land tenure as
a legal form of tenure. The new Land Act, passed in 1998, conﬁrmed this and provided
details on how customary land could be owned. In practice, the law acknowledges the cus-
tomary usage of land and prevents state expropriation of such land. But at the same time,
it declares that any vacant public land be held in trust by the State, which prevented the
expansion of the Acholi population to vacant areas. Because the new Constitution and
Land Act were passed while most of the population of Northern Uganda was living in
camps far from their customary land and forbidden to farm beyond a radius of 2 km
around the camps, these new laws were not integrated into state practices until after the
cessation of hostilities in 2006.
Once peace was secured, more than 2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who
had lived in camps for 10–20 years, went back “home”. This return phase was character-
ised by a high number of land disputes. The land had not been farmed for 10 years.
Boundaries between ﬁelds had disappeared and had to be re-established. Many people
had died during the war and land inheritance issues had been pending for a long time. All
land inheritance cases had to be solved at once when people began to return home. More-
over, because there had been different phases of displacement with some people forced to
move to a new place for a few years only to be displaced again into camps, people did not
always know exactly where they had to return to when they were asked to “go back to
where they came from before displacement”. All this created many land disputes.
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Traditional leaders, who used to solve these conﬂicts before the war, now faced new chal-
lenges during the return period. Some elders had died during the war and their knowledge of
land history and boundaries disappeared with them. Traditional leaders had also lost much of
their authority during the displacement into camps. Part of their authority had rested on the
ownership of cattle, but they had lost all their cattle during the war. Food relief in camps was
distributed by women, which further weakened the authority of elder men. Life in camps was
characterised by an extremely high density of population; in this kind of “urban” life, the tradi-
tional norms and social control mechanisms that once accompanied life in rural areas were
weakened. According to Branch (2008, 10), “Acholi elders and chiefs have largely lost their
power of social regulation, their role of mediating conﬂicts, and their political leadership role”.
These elders and chiefs today are in a weaker position to solve land conﬂicts than they were
before the war, although they seem to be regaining some of their lost power in recent years.
Traditionally, land conﬂicts often accompany social conﬂicts. Jealousy between co-
wives, witchcraft accusations within the family or among neighbours, disagreements
between brothers, husbands, and wives, widows and brothers in-law, or mothers-in-law
and daughters-in-law, create social tensions that can easily translate into land conﬂicts.
When it is difﬁcult for family members or neighbours to live peacefully in the same loca-
tion, conﬁscating the land of an opponent is a common strategy to force him or her to
move elsewhere, which puts a deﬁnitive end to the social dispute. Access to land requires
peaceful cohabitation with those who border or share this land, and as soon as social con-
ﬂicts erupt, sharing land becomes problematic. Old agreements can be re-evaluated and
eventually cancelled, which forces people to move elsewhere to ﬁnd new land. It is there-
fore primarily people with fractured family relations that face problems accessing and
securing land (see also Branch 2007, 36).
All these traditional conﬂicts reappeared when people started moving back to their
home areas after the end of the war in 2006. But something changed during the war that
had added another dimension to land conﬂicts: land commoditisation. Before the war,
land was not seen as a commodity in Northern Uganda. It was not acquired with money
but by hand power (clearing vacant land) or through social relations (people controlling a
huge chunks of land would give a piece of their land for free to newcomers who were ask-
ing for it). During the war, however, land suitable for farming surrounding IDP camps
was very rare and in high demand, and was rented out for a high price. Land thus began
to be commodiﬁed.
Moreover, at the end of the conﬂict, IDPs were sensitised to the value of land, which
was the only remaining capital left to the Acholi after they had lost all their cattle and
material belongings during the war. Furthermore, the new Land Act contributed to chang-
ing people’s perception of land by allowing them to own land customarily and by closing
the old ways of expanding into vacant land. There were a few cases of highly controversial
“land grabs”, such as the famous “Madhvani” land deal, in which the Ugandan Govern-
ment leased 40,000 hectares (ha) to an Indian multinational company in Amuru district
to produce sugar cane (see, for example Barnabas 2013; Martiniello 2015; Stickler 2012).
Such cases began to convince people that land had now become a commodity. The combi-
nation of all these aspects triggered a massive scramble for land as soon as people began to
return home. Today, land has become equated with money, and everyone is looking for
ways to control as much land as possible before it falls under someone else’s control,
which triggers both land conﬂicts and forum shopping.
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Land speculation and land conﬂicts are especially strong in the areas gazetted to
become new urban centres, such as in Amuru. Since the compensation paid by the gov-
ernment to buy land for roads or public buildings in the new urban areas can be six to
seven times higher than for adjacent land that is not part of the urban plan, there are
many opportunities for people who are strategically located and able to grab the land of
their neighbours in order to enrich themselves quickly. It is often people who were given
land before the war who are the target of attempted “land-grabs”: they are told that they
do not belong to the locality and should go back to their “home area” and use their clan’s
land. This form of “patrilineal fundamentalism” (Whyte et al. 2013) thus impacts on the
legitimacy and permanence of the gift of land made in previous generations in order to
seize land that has now acquired a monetary value. Moreover, since there were few proper
marriages during the war (cattle had been lost and the bride price could not be paid), and
since many children were born out of wedlock, the clan afﬁliation of many people is now
dubious. This can be used as an argument to refuse to give land to people with question-
able pedigrees. Widows are also sometimes denied the right to stay on their husband’s
land, even though this is a clear contradiction of customary law (Whyte et al 2013). From
some of the cases that we have followed, we can conclude that even when customary law
and customary leaders do acknowledge the right of widows and long-term occupants to
continue farming the land that they used before the war, their rulings are not always sufﬁ-
cient to deter land speculators from occupying and eventually selling land that (according
to customary rights gained through past occupancy) is not theirs.
For the past 10 years, land conﬂicts have been on everyone’s lips in Northern Uganda
and have attracted a lot of attention from government, politicians, the media, NGOs,
donor agencies, religious leaders, and researchers (Hopwood and Atkinson 2013, 17). The
Trustland research project to which we are attached reﬂects this increased interest in land
conﬂicts in the region. Women tend to be portrayed as victims in such land conﬂicts,
both by researchers and by NGOs. In the Lango region of Northern Uganda, for example,
LEMU (2009) reported that:
most widows and almost all divorced women face land rights violations. (…) Widows face
several threats to their land. Often, their in-laws simply take over the land, and many widows
do not have the physical strength to resist. Clan authorities tell themselves and others that
they protect widows well, but in practice they often side with the land grabbers (the in-laws),
or they may simply ignore the case. Where they do rule in favour of the widow, the in-laws
may simply ignore their decision, and nothing is then followed up.
Gray and Kevane (1999) concur with this grim picture, and argue that it is not limited
to Uganda but generally occurs throughout the continent. In a review of the situation of
women’s land rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, they argue that:
when land becomes scarce or rises in value, or when rights are formalized through titles or
registration (…) Men use their position of dominance to “expropriate” women’s rights to
land. Women, whose rights to farm a plot of land were guaranteed by marital or kinship sta-
tus, lose these rights and face a diminished access to land which underlies and reinforces a
greater economic and social insecurity. The literature on women’s access to land is replete
with examples of these often dramatic reductions in rights (Gray and Kevane 1999, 17).
Even when women have become empowered as a consequence of life in the IDP camps,
such as in Northern Uganda, this is seen as too good to last and almost always to their
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disadvantage – the higher they rise, the harder they may fall. For example, Branch claims
that during the period of forced displacement to towns, “women, and to a lesser extent
youth, have seen their authority and status rise precipitously in town”, a change that
he sees as “nothing short of historic” (Branch 2008, 10). But he also believes that:
“Although ﬁrm adherence to patrilineal and patrilocal norms has been disrupted at pres-
ent as a result of the war and displacement, this only increases the potential negative
impact of their purposeful re-imposition by male authorities upon women and youth”
(Branch 2008, 16).
While we agree that women have indeed less to say than men in customary land man-
agement in Northern Uganda and that this is a form of discrimination, we nevertheless
believe that portraying women as perpetual victims of men’s greed and violence is a cliche
that hides a more complex picture. The more complex and comprehensive picture can
only be understood by talking to all parties in a conﬂict instead of talking to women only,
as is often the case in reports and articles systematically presenting women as victims. In
our experience, when women’s rights are challenged in a land conﬂict, it can be due to
other women with whom they have a social conﬂict. Even when a land conﬂict involves
people of both genders, women are sometimes on the side of the claimant who is trying to
“dispossess” a man. In any case, our research and the case studies discussed below show
that women are not totally powerless and are not always on the side of the losers. Women
do have statutory and customary rights as well as strategies to assert these rights and win
their case, a point that is also acknowledged by Gray and Kevane (1999, 17):
Women, like men, are responding to reduced access by manipulating meanings underlying
rights, by changing the incidence of exercise of rights, and by using political spaces to forge
new rights. They are diverting norms of exclusion, making them more “friendly” to their
interests. They are using norms that empower them in other domains to gain access to land.
This view is also supported by ﬁve case studies published in a book on women’s land
rights in East Africa (Adoko and Levine 2008; Ansoms and Holvoet 2008; Daley 2008;
Englert 2008; Okuro 2008) demonstrating that “women in Eastern Africa are not power-
less actors but ﬁnd creative means to claim and ensure their rights to land” (Englert and
Daley 2008, 3). Likewise, Kindi (2010) notes that although the post-war situation poses
many challenges to women trying to access land, it also creates different opportunities to
improve women’s conditions. Following these lines of thought, we argue here that forum
shopping between different legal institutions is one of the avenues that can be strategically
used by women to enhance their land claims.
Methods
The data on which this article is based have been collected through a total of 12 months of
ﬁeldwork in the Acholi region, mainly in Gulu and Amuru districts. This data comes from
a mix of methods. First, we interviewed 26 different actors who play a role in conﬂict reso-
lution, including magistrates, lawyers, traditional chiefs (Clan Chiefs and Rwot Kweri-
Chiefs of the Hoe), Local Council members (LC) of various levels (LC1, LC2, LC3, LC5),
Chief Administrative Ofﬁcer (CAO), Resident District Commissioner (RDC), NGOs
working on land issues in the Acholi Sub-Region of Northern Uganda, and paralegals
trained by NGOs and working at village levels (the lowest administrative level in Uganda).
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Second, we selected (on a convenience sampling) and followed over time and space
four cases on complex land conﬂicts involving women. All these cases were registered
with a dispute resolution body. In addition, we tracked the path that the disputants under-
took in and out of the different resolution fora in a bid to have their disputes resolved. We
interviewed all stakeholders on all sides of the conﬂicts, including family members, neigh-
bours, local leaders, lawyers, magistrates, paralegals, and NGO actors. For each of cases,
we interviewed on average 10–20 people, depending on the number of people involved in
the conﬂict.
We also conducted three focus group discussions. Two of these targeted 10–15 individ-
uals each and included both men and women and other stakeholders involved in dispute
resolution, generally at the local level. A third focus group discussion speciﬁcally targeted
female participants. Finally, we went through the archives of the Amuru Magistrates
Court over the past four years, and quantiﬁed key facts regarding land conﬂicts, such as
the gender and age of plaintiffs and defendants, the type of conﬂict, and the outcome of
court cases generally ﬁled before the court. Our ﬁeldwork was part of a research project
on land conﬂicts in post-war Northern Uganda that has been ﬁnanced by the Danish
Development Agency (DANIDA).
Statutory and customary approaches to gender and land tenure
The Constitution of Uganda and the Land Act provide for equality between men and
women with regard to access, ownership, and disposition of property before, during, and
upon the dissolution of a marriage, and further provides that all customs that discriminate
against women are null and void to the extent of its inconsistency (Articles 2, 33(5) C1995
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda; Section 27 Land Act, 1998). However, customary
tenure holds that land in the Acholi sub-region is controlled by men through membership
in a particular clan. The customary rationale given to exclude women from controlling
land is that in a society practising clan exogamy and patrilocality, women usually marry
outside of their home area and are expected to move to their husband’s place. Women are
expected to then gain land rights from their husbands’ homes. Moreover, since children
belong to the clan of their father, allowing daughters to inherit land on a par with their
brothers would soon create a situation in which land is no longer controlled by clans but
can pass from one clan to another with each new generation. In other words, placing men
and women on an equal footing in controlling and inheriting land would be the end of
the territorialisation of clans.
Women have dual identities as sisters in the families of origin and wives in their fami-
lies by marriage. They have thereby customary land rights both through their father (or
brothers) for those who have remained unmarried, or through their husband (or late hus-
band’s clan) for widows (Anying 2012, 19–24). The status of married women and their
access to land in their husband’s lineage is generally more secure when the full bride price
has been paid at marriage and when they have given birth to children. But even women
who are “not properly married” or women who have not produced any child can claim
some customary rights over their “husband”s’ land. As a rule, widows have the right to
stay in their late husband’s place and keep farming land in the name of their male chil-
dren, who will inherit their father’s land one day. If a widow does not wish to stay in her
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late husband’s place (if she does not wish to be inherited by a member of her husband’s
clan, for example), or if a woman divorces, she normally goes back with her younger chil-
dren to her father’s place (her own clan), where she is given land to farm. But her children
are supposed to go back to their father’s place when they become adults in order to estab-
lish themselves in their own clan and farm their clan’s land.
Thus, in this system, men have in theory more control over land, but women have in
practice more opportunities than men to ﬁnd land to farm, as they can access land
through their husband/children, through their father/brother, or even through their
mother/maternal uncle side. Male children, on their side, have fewer options than their
mother, as they normally either access land through their father, or acquire new land by
clearing vacant land. If they fail to do so, they might still access land through their moth-
er’s side, but such arrangement is usually seen as a temporary solution and is likely to
bring conﬂicts if it continues. Polygamy, divorce, and remarriage render the negotiation
of rights relatively complex, as half-siblings growing up in the same place might belong to
different clans and have different rights.
Statutory and customary laws have a very different take on land and gender equality.
Our data and observations from the ﬁeld show that statutory and customary institutions
also work in very different ways to resolve conﬂicts. First, the formal system makes judge-
ments stating who is right and wrong and identifying a winner and a loser, while alterna-
tive fora do not have the power to pass judgement and can only do mediations that seek
consensus and compromise acceptable to all parties (a situation that is conﬁrmed by our
ﬁeld data, see also Stevens 2000). The fact that alternative fora generally lead to compro-
mises tend to advantage people who claim land used by someone else, as claimants will
usually gain (and defendants will lose) something in the process. Second, the formal sys-
tem is expensive (the court fee is 90,000 shillings, plus fees for lawyers) and takes a long
time to resolve conﬂicts. Our statistical data obtained from the land registry in Amuru
District Court from 2012 to 2014 collected in September of 2014 indicates that out of the
149 cases ﬁled between 2012 and 2014, only ﬁve judgements have been passed, and only
after a period of at least 2 years.
The informal system, by contrast, is affordable to most and is quicker. The complain-
ant just has to provide food and drinks, and pay for the transport of the people taking
part in the mediation. The mediation meeting is organised relatively rapidly (within a few
weeks, or two months at most) and is open to all, with many people participating (a few
people from the local councils, some elders, witnesses, neighbours, possibly some partici-
pants from an NGO or other administrative institutions, and so on). When consensus is
reached among this large number of prominent local actors, the case is considered solved
and is backed up by all the people who participated in it. However, this resolution does
not prevent parties of the conﬂicts to feel unjustly treated and to refuse the decision or
bring their case to the formal justice system.
Forum shopping in Northern Uganda
Women (and men) involved in a land conﬂict can choose between many different avenues
in order to bring their case. Five different types of institutions are involved in land dispute
resolution in Northern Uganda:
10 I. W. ANYING AND Q. GAUSSET
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(1) Formal Court System: Dispute concerning customary land tenure may be ﬁled
before the Grade 1 Magistrate Court as a ﬁrst court of instance of the respective geo-
graphical area in which the land in dispute is located. There is generally no pecuni-
ary limitation. The judgment passed by the Magistrates Grade 1 Court may be
appealed to the Chief Magistrates courts and thereafter to the High Court. The
judgement made by any of these courts, unless otherwise appealed against, is
enforceable as against the party whom the judgement has been passed by the party
in whose favour the judgement was passed. Enforcement of judgement is usually a
whole new process in itself, and can involve the police. The party seeking to enforce
the judgment has to apply to the court to enforce the same.
(2) Traditional institutions: These are mandated by Section 88 (1) of the Land Act of 1998
to determine disputes over customary tenure, or act as a mediator between people who
are in dispute over any matters arising out of customary tenure. The structural, proce-
dural, and normative structure of this institution is not dictated by the state. Although
there is no uniform composition and hierarchy of the traditional power structure in
Acholi Sub-Region, it can be broadly sketched as a hierarchical structure ranging from
the household level to the level of the chiefdom. At the hamlet level, we have the head
of household, followed by the head of family (Won Paco), and then the “Chief of the
Hoe” (Rwot Kweri, formally elected by the local community), a position created under
the colonial administration. At the clan level, one ﬁnds the representative of the chief
(Lawang Rwot), the clan head (Ladit Kaka), and ﬁnally, the clan chief (Rwot Moo),
who is a member of the “royal clan” that dominates the region (Girling 1960). Dispu-
tants can bring a land case to any of these institutions or to several of them at the
same time. Despite the hierarchy between traditional leaders, there is no appeal struc-
ture within the traditional institutions. Cases are transferred back and forth among
the leaders. Disputants therefore have the possibility to begin at the lowest level, and
gradually go higher up in the hierarchy if they are not satisﬁed with the outcome, or
they can go to more than one of the leaders simultaneously. Unlike the decisions of
the formal Magistrates Courts, the overriding principle in the dispute resolution is
mediation that tries to reach a compromise based on restoring the relationship of the
conﬂicting parties and promoting harmony in the clan and family (Anying 2012, 31).
Further, there is no provision in the law that stipulates how the decision of the tradi-
tional leaders can be enforced. Enforcement is based purely on moral obligation and
goodwill of the parties, and does not involve the police.
(3) Local council courts (LCC): The LCCs are established under the Local Council
Court Act of 2006, which regulates in part their jurisdiction and mode of operation.
The Local Council Court 1 is found at the village level, where the elected executive
committee constitutes itself into a court to hear disputes. The Local Council Court 2
operates at the parish level and the Local Council Court 3 is found at the sub-county
level. The local councillors are elected by the local community; they act as executive
ofﬁcers of the Local Council Committee and at the same time as (quasi) judicial ofﬁ-
cers of the Local Council Courts. The Court is constituted when ﬁve to eight mem-
bers of the committee are present to hear a dispute. The procedures are simpliﬁed
and the hearing is informal and conducted in indigenous languages. However, the
Local Council Courts were declared illegitimate by the Constitutional Court in
2006, which effectively took away their mandate to legally sit as a court. Prior to
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their being declared illegitimate, they could, as a matter of law, pass judgements,
which could be enforced, unless otherwise appealed to the chief magistrates courts.
Today, LC courts continue to mediate land conﬂicts, but they can no longer pass
legal judgement. In practice, however, disputants continue to follow the hierarchy
in the LCC Courts, and make ﬁrst instance calls at the LC1, and follow through to
the hierarchy up to the LC3, although this process is no longer legal and is therefore
informal. When they consult the next hierarchy, it is not an appeal, as they handle
the same issues handled by the lower hierarchy.
(4) Elected and appointed government ofﬁcials: a number of disputants consult Chief
Administrative Ofﬁcers (CAO), Resident District Commissioners (RDC), or chairper-
sons at the LC5 level to get help in their land conﬂict. The ofﬁce of the Chief Adminis-
trative Ofﬁcer is a government-appointed position based at the district level, at the sub-
county level there is the Senior Principal Secretary, and the Community Development
Ofﬁcer at the parish level is the Parish Chief. The Local Council V is the political head
of the district and is an elective position. The Resident District Commissioner, on his
side, is a presidential appointee and represents the president in the District. These actors
have no formal authority/jurisdiction to handle land disputes, but in the post-conﬂict
Acholi sub-region have played an instrumental role in land conﬂict resolution. When
approached, these actors participate primarily inmediations to try to settle land disputes
amicably (Burke and Egaru 2011; Hopwood and Atkinson 2013). They do not pass
judgement – they have no jurisdiction to do so – but people consult them because of
their position of power and the authority that derives from it.
(5) NGOs also play a very instrumental role in land dispute resolution. In the post-con-
ﬂict Acholi sub-region, a number of NGOs have sprung up and developed a man-
date to handle land disputes by positioning themselves as an alternative forum.
They provide general legal advice to parties in land disputes, but also conduct medi-
ations and represent parties in court. Disputants consult NGOs as an alternative
fora, although they also sometimes work together with the traditional institutions
and the Local Council Courts. NGOs are also seen by the local population as a gate-
way to the formal system, because of the assistance they provide in the representa-
tion of parties before formal courts of law.
As the Figure 1 demonstrates, the choice that people have to make is not just between
formality or informality, but between ﬁve different types of institutions, and between dif-
ferent institutions within each of the ﬁve types.
Forum shopping can be horizontal when it is possible to choose between different and
parallel fora (such as the ﬁve types described above). It can also be horizontal when one
can choose between several fora of a same type nested in a hierarchy, such as within the
traditional authorities or within the LC court system (Helfer 1999; Unruh 2009). The for-
mal system does not allow vertical forum shopping, because it applies the principle of res
judicata, which means that the appellate court cannot deal with the same issues dealt with
by a lower court. Forum shopping can be simultaneous when it is possible to bring one’s
case to different fora concurrently (either vertically, such as within the customary system,
or horizontally between the ﬁve different systems). It can also be successive, when one
must wait for the case to be judged in one forum before being able to bring it to another
(such as appealing within the formal or LC court systems).
12 I. W. ANYING AND Q. GAUSSET
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The ﬁve kinds of fora found in Northern Uganda all deal with the same land issues, and
do this concurrently, since a disputant can ﬁle a case before more than one dispute resolu-
tion body at the same time. The implication of this is that a disputant may ﬁle a case
before the traditional institution, and before its conclusion, ﬁle the same case concurrently
before the Magistrates courts. In addition, the disputant may also open up a case ﬁle with
an NGO and even seek help based on the same issue and facts from an elected or
appointed government ofﬁce. This possibility is not only restricted to the plaintiff, it also
extends to the defendant. For example, whereas the plaintiff may ﬁle a case before a tradi-
tional institution, a defendant may go ahead and ﬁle a case before a magistrate’s court.
Since forum shopping is unregulated and the two systems do not complement each other,
both institutions may indeed make decisions on the same case. We will now discuss two
concrete case studies that demonstrate how women can use the possibilities offered by
forum shopping to claim land rights.
Two cases on gender and forum shopping in Amuru
Case 1: Santa vs. Mwalim
Lupwole had two sons, Oola and Akwilino (see Figure 2). Oola married Mariana and
moved to his wife’s birth place where he was given land by his in-laws. He brought with
Figure 2. Kinship diagram of Santa and her in-laws.
Figure 1. Forum shopping and institutions involved in land conﬂict resolution.
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him his brother, Akwilino. Oola had nine children, including three sons called Obalo (the
ﬁrst-born), Odong, and Mwalim. Akwilino had several children, including a son called
Onyutt. Obalo married Santa and had four children with her. After Obalo died in an
Internally Displaced Person’s (IDP) camp, Santa had a relationship with Onyutt, who was
much younger than she was, and had a daughter with him. But Onyutt did not want to
inherit Santa through levirate. Odong, who is now the legal heir of Oola’s estate, did not
want to inherit Santa either. Instead, Santa was inherited by Ocan Justine, a clan brother
of her late husband, with whom she has four children.
Today, Santa has a conﬂict with her in-laws about where to farm and establish her
homestead. At the end of the civil war, the children of Oola and Akwilino and their
spouses and children all moved back to where they were before being displaced by the
war in 1996. The family demarcated land for everyone, but Santa refused the land that
was allocated to her and instead constructed her house on land that belonged to Mwalim.
At the same time, Santa ﬁled a case in the Local Council Court 1 against her in-laws,
claiming that they had been accusing her of being a witch and were not allowing her to
farm on land that used to belong to her husband. She also complained that the place that
had been designated as the homestead was her garden before and during displacement.
The local council enquired and did not ﬁnd trace of witchcraft, and advised her to move
her house and farm where she had been allocated land. Santa then asked for assistance
from the Uganda Land Alliance (ULA), an NGO that provides legal advice and conducts
mediations on land issues, claiming that her in-laws were farming on the ﬁelds that she
used to farm with her husband. The NGO tried to mediate the conﬂict and agreed with
the in-laws that they should not farm in her old ﬁelds (which they were not doing any-
way), and they asked Santa to move her house where the head of the homestead (dog
gang) had allocated her a place to stay. Still dissatisﬁed, Santa went to the clan head and
claimed that her in-laws were abusing her and trying to chase her away. By the time the
ﬁeld notes of this case were compiled, the clan had not yet met.
When we talked privately to Santa, she brought other arguments to the table, such as
the fact that there are graves on the land she has been allocated to build her house and
that she does not want to live next to graves. She also claimed that Onyutt is building a
house on the land where Santa used to live with her husband (which appears not to be
true). Under the surface, it appears that Santa does not want to move her house, because
she does not want to live too close to her in-laws and because she wants to live near the
road (Amuru is being upgraded as a town, there is a lot of land speculation, and land adja-
cent to roads is the most valuable). Santa resents being under the authority of her brother-
in-law, and would like to be the master of her own destiny. She would like Odong to
demarcate land among the three brothers (Odong, Mwalim, and herself in the name of
Obalo), and exclude all cousins (the children of Akwilino), who were also allocated land
after the return from the camp. Prior to displacement, the children of Akwilino lived
about 10 kilometers away, but occasionally farmed on the land in dispute. Santa also
claims to be willing to exchange farm land with Mwalim, if he would allow her to stay
where she is. She has built two extra houses on Mwalim’s land since she brought the case
to the LC1 and the NGO, despite having found no support whatsoever for her case – even
her own children now prefer to live at their uncle’s place.
When we talked with Santa’s in-laws, the story took on another dimension. The in-laws
claimed to have no conﬂict with her, to respect her highly as the ﬁrst wife of the ﬁrst-born
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of the family, the woman with the highest authority, and the one that knows all the farm-
ing boundaries. There is plenty of farming land, and they don’t mind her farming another
plot if she does not like the one she is farming now. They don’t want to chase her away.
On the contrary, they would like her to move closer to them, as they are part of the same
family. This last point seems to be what is really at stake, and the traditional understand-
ing of the extended family as united and solidary group under the leadership of the fam-
ily’s head is confronted by Santa’s wish to decide for herself. They also explain Santa’s
reluctance to live with them by reference to her (rather shameful) liaison with Onyutt,
and by the refusal of Odong to inherit her. The in-laws are amused by the fact that Santa
always presents herself as a widow when the LC court or the NGO come to mediate the
issue, although she is now married to Ocan Justine – there is a strong awareness nationally
about the vulnerable position of widows. They also note that Santa always comes to
Odong to ﬁnd a solution when her children misbehave, but refuses his authority when he
tries to encourage the family to collaborate and live together.
Case 2: Sylvia vs. Lanyuru
Sylvia married Acaye in 1979 and had six children with him. Acaye was a police ofﬁcer
and all the children are relatively well-off today. In the beginning of the 1990s, Acaye
became sick and violent, and Sylvia’s family came to remove her from her husband’s place
to bring her back to her pre-marital home. In 1993, Acaye committed suicide. In 2007,
when people left the IDP camps, Sylvia did not want to go back to her parents’ place,
because accessing land there was complicated. She decided instead to come back to her
dead husband’s place. Her brothers-in-law refused to give her the piece of land that she
was asking for, especially Lanyuru, the eldest surviving brother-in-law, who is also a mem-
ber of the area land committee (responsible for demarcating land, solving land disputes,
etc.).
Sylvia then built a house on her husband’s land, but her house was burnt to the ground
(allegedly by Lanyuru, although there was no proof and he was not convicted of any crim-
inal offence). The Catholic Church allowed Sylva to build a hut on church land, while Syl-
via reported her case to the police. The police talked to Lanyuru and asked him to let
Sylvia stay and settle on her late husband’s land. Her last-born son came from town to
help her rebuild a permanent house, which is still in the process of being built.
But Lanyuru continued to ask her to leave and Sylvia reported the case to the council of
elders (dogola). During the meeting, Lanyuru asked Sylvia to refund the bride price
because she had abandoned her husband. The elders took Sylvia’s side, and said that she
did not have to refund bride price and could stay on her late husband’s land. Still, Lanyuru
continued to disturb Sylvia, claiming that she had killed her husband and was bringing
witchcraft in the family. Sylvia went to the Rwot Kweri, but she did not pursue this proce-
dure because she thought that the chief was not impartial (he was too closely related to
Anyuru and too much on his side). Sylvia went to the Uganda Land Alliance (ULA) NGO
to ask for help. Lanyuru, on his part, went to LC1 asking that the land be divided. A meet-
ing was organised in which the ULA, the LC1, and the elders were present, and the land
was divided. But only Acaye’s land was divided, not Lanyuru’s, which means that Lanyuru
and Sylvia each gained control over half of Acaye’s land in the process. Sylvia reluctantly
accepted the decision, under pressure from her own children, who told her not to
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complain. Sylvia is now calling for a clan meeting to plant trees on the boundary between
her and Lanyuru’s land, to make sure that no one trespasses boundaries in the future. In
the meantime, Sylvia has received extra farm land from another clan brother of her late
husband. Despite having conﬂicts with Lanyuru, Sylvia still goes to him whenever she has
a problem with one of her children, and he helps her solve this kind of problem. Lanyuru
is also organising the wedding of Sylvia’s daughter, and he will be getting the bride price
as her father.
Sylvia thinks that the conﬂict she has with Lanyuru stems from the fact that he wanted
to inherit her but that she refused to be inherited by him because he was like a child to
her (her husband used to pay Lanyuru’s school fees). She suspects that he is jealous
because she had a relationship with another clan brother of her deceased husband and
begat one child with him while she was living in IDP camps. She also suspects that
Lanyuru accused her of witchcraft simply because he is interested in her late husband’s
land. The fact that her husband was better educated and had a good job in town probably
added another dimension to the conﬂict, as villagers tend to consider that their brothers
who have left the village to live and work in town have also left the land behind them for
those who choose to remain in rural areas, which gives way to many conﬂicts.
Seen from Lanyuru’s point of view, it is Sylvia who tried to grab land from him, not
him trying to chase her away. He claims that she tried to grab land by force by building
her house and farming on his land without asking him permission.
Discussion
A number of observations can be made from the two cases described above. First, in both
cases, women succeed in securing long-term access to land in their late husbands’ places,
sometimes despite all odds (coming back after 20 years of absence, or grabbing land that
did not belong to their husbands). The conﬂict is not so much about their right to access
land in their husband’s clan; rather, it is about the size and location of the land. The fact
that Amuru is in the process of becoming a town, and that land speculation is rife, makes
land size and location important aspects of these conﬂicts. Women want a slice of the
speculative cake, and do not always end up losing, as Santa’s case shows us.
Second, neither woman brought their case to the formal court system, but both brought
their case to the Uganda Land Alliance NGO. NGOs are commonly seen as the gateway to
the formal court system, but in both cases the NGO chose to organise mediations rather
than take these women’s cases to court. And in both cases, the women brought their cases
to elders or LC1-3 at the same time as they asked for help from NGO, and continued
doing so after the end of the mediation and after the NGO was out of the picture. Women
play different cards in different systems. When talking to NGOs, they present themselves
as vulnerable widows, as exempliﬁed by Santa’s case (widows receive a lot of attention
from the national government and international donors). When dealing with heads of
household, elders and LC courts, however, they present themselves as “wives of the clan”,
having acquired rights on clan land through marriage and by producing clan children, or
because they are still married to a clan member through levirate.
Third, and most importantly in both cases, land conﬂicts are about much more than
land. On the one hand, these conﬂicts are about marriage and clan identity. Women’s
access to land is always made through marriage into their husband’s clan. Accessing land
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requires that they accept their duties of being a “wife of the clan”, and conversely, the men
they are in conﬂict with must fulﬁl their duties as heads of households. So, despite having
land conﬂicts, or even social conﬂicts, men and women collaborate, for example, when-
ever men have to solve a problem or organise the wedding of the women’s children. In
both our cases, clan elders always supported the claim of widows to access clan land; the
disagreement was more concerned with the location and size of the land. In these cases,
land conﬂicts are not so much about access to land per se, as they are about ﬁnding the
right balance of power between male heads of household or clan elders who are demand-
ing respect for their authority over women, and women who want to gain independence
from their in-laws and want to exert personal control over a piece of land.
On the other hand, land conﬂicts are also social conﬂicts. Old grudges, expressed
through accusations of jealousy, murder or witchcraft, are never far away. People who dis-
like one another for some reason continue to be forced to live side-by-side as neighbours
and in-laws. The geographical proximity of people transforms social conﬂicts into land
conﬂict, since forcing an opponent to move away is the most radical type of solution to
social conﬂicts. Data from other cases collected in our research show that a majority of
land conﬂicts involving women originate in social conﬂicts between in-laws, cousins or
co-wives. Whenever land conﬂicts are proxies of social conﬂicts, land issues cannot be
solved unless social harmony is restored at the same time.
This last point is, in our view, one of the keys to understanding the forum shopping
strategies deployed by women. Women who have a social conﬂict that translates into a
land conﬂict know that solving their problem requires being accepted as a wife of the clan
and ﬁnding some form of understanding and peace with the person with whom they are
in conﬂict. They also know that if NGOs (or the formal court system) can help them in
formally securing their rights to land, these decisions will not be accepted and enforced
unless they ﬁnd a solution to witchcraft accusations, to the shame they bear from past
“misbehaviour”, or to their position within the clan depending on their marital situation
(e.g. whether bride price was paid or not, or whether they have produced children).
NGOs and courts do not deal with these issues, even though they are at the core of social
conﬂicts, which is why women always involve elders and LCs to ﬁnd acceptable solutions
to their social problems and thereby also to their land problems. Involving NGOs is an
important leverage, because NGOs carry with them the implied threat to bring the case to
court if it is not respecting the rights of women. But in ﬁne, mediations rest on applying
customary law rather than formal law, and women need the continuous support of elders
to solve their social conﬂicts and to practically assert their rights on their husband’s clan
land.
Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that land conﬂicts involving women are often proxies of
social conﬂicts and can therefore not be satisfactorily solved unless the social conﬂicts are
solved at the same time. Since the formal system of justice and the NGOs that work as
gateways to this system do not recognise the social dimension of land conﬂicts, the cus-
tomary or informal institutions must ﬁll the vacant space and have a major role to play in
both land and social conﬂict resolution. Our research demonstrates that customary insti-
tutions play a major role in resolving land conﬂicts and that they can also work for the
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beneﬁt of women. Forum shopping, including informal institutions, allows women to
gather together a large number of local powerful actors to help them solve both their
social and their land conﬂicts with quick and affordable mediations that reach compro-
mises acceptable to all parties.
Interestingly, even NGOs, who are seen as the gateway to formal justice for those who
cannot afford it, prefer mediations to formal court cases whenever possible. By carrying
the threat that they would challenge in court any unjust compromise, with long delays
and at a high ﬁnancial cost for the opposing party, NGOs also provide a strong incentive
to ﬁnd a solution that is acceptable to all, at least when it comes to land. But as land con-
ﬂicts are often proxies for social conﬂicts, women cannot be entirely satisﬁed with media-
tions that do not address the social causes of land conﬂicts, which explains why they
continue to involve customary institutions even after mediations have been organised.
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